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1. Introduction 
In his lead article, John Broome discusses views which understand being rational as responding 
correctly to one’s reasons. He first provides a genealogy of how ‘rational’ entered the English 
language, thereby fixing the object of his theory—i.e., the property to which our current use of 
‘rational’ commonly refers to. Broome then presents some careful objections against the views of 
Kiesewetter and Lord. He concludes that ‘it is false that rationality consists in responding correctly 
to reasons’ [sect. 8]. 
Broome also claims that ‘[m]ost philosophers who write about rationality intend to write 
about it as it is commonly understood’ [sect. 4]. That is, he claims that not only the object of his 
own theory is determined by the ordinary use of ‘rational’, but also the object of the theories he 
objects to. His claim is: 
 (I) The object of theories of rationality is determined by our ordinary concept of rationality. 
 
As Broome specifies, rationality is commonly understood as a mental property of a person; fur-
thermore, rationality can be ‘reified’ in the same way as morality can be reified: it can be conceived 
of as an entity that places requirements on us. If we fulfil all those requirements, then we possess 
the property of rationality to the highest possible degree. 
Another claim that is suggested by Broome’s brief remarks on the metaphilosophy of ra-
tionality should be distinguished from (I): 
 
(II) The method of theories of rationality is to analyze ‘rational’. 
 
I am not sure whether Broome analyzes ‘rational’. But many theorists of rationality don’t. Lord 
[2018: 6] explicitly says that he provides a ‘real definition’ of the property of rationality, which he 
contrasts with conceptual analysis. And Wedgwood [2018: 23] points out that he engages in ‘con-
structive theory-building’—a kind of theorizing that contrasts with philosophy that is ‘closer to 
everyday thought’. This suggest that what these philosophers do is to explicate a concept of ra-
tionality, maybe in order to carve normativity at its joints (Lord), or maybe just to show that we 
can conceive of a property that, say, supervenes on the mind, has normative authority, and is a 
good means to achieve an external aim, like truth (Wedgwood). Theorists of rationality might thus 
start out by making claims about our ordinary use of ‘rational’, but they then deviate from this use 
for specific theoretical purposes. 
It can lead to significant misunderstandings in a debate if there are disagreements about its 
object or its method: we might end up talking about different things or engage in different kinds 
of projects. In this commentary, I focus on the object of current theories of rationality. I will argue 
that theorists of rationality are not just concerned with the ordinary use of ‘rational’ (section 2). 
Rather, due to their philosophical interests they pick out a specific use that is intimately connected 
to blame and praise. I call the property this use refers to ‘rationalityRESP’, because it presupposes 
the subject’s direct responsibility for their attitudes. I then present an argument why rationalityRESP 
is plausibly identical to a kind of reasons-responsiveness (section 3). However, this does not settle 
whether rationality is identical to normativity. In addition, we would either have to endorse 
internalism about normativity or externalism about rationality. I finally argue that Broome’s dis-
pute with proponents of such views hinge on questions regarding responsibility (section 4). I con-
clude that discussions about responsibility should play a central role within debates about ration-
ality (section 5). 
 
2. RationalityRESP 
Philosophers often pick out specific uses of a term in order to determine the object of their theory. 
Broome himself thinks that 
 
[f]or the sake of philosophical analysis, we must expect to have to give ‘ought’ a more precise meaning 
than it has in common English. At the very least, we may exclude some ordinary uses of ‘ought’ in order 
to avoid ambiguity. [2016: 6] 
 
The uses of a word on which a philosophical theory focusses are ideally determined by the philos-
opher’s interests. One of the central philosophical interests in thinking about rationality is to un-
derstand the significance of rational requirements—as a central interest in thinking about morality 
is to understand the significance of moral requirements. I argue in this section that this specific 
theoretical interest justifies a restriction to uses of ‘rational’ that refer to instances of rationality 
for which we are held responsible. 
To see what I mean by rationalityRESP, consider how irrationality is used as implying criti-
cizability in the debate. When Parfit uses ‘irrational’, he uses the term ‘in its ordinary sense, to 
mean, roughly, ‘deserves strong criticism of the kind that we also express with words like “fool-
ish”, “stupid”, and “crazy”’’’ [Parfit 2011: 123]. Kiesewetter [2017: chapter 2] points out that we 
use ‘irrational’ as personal criticism (see also [Lord 2018: 4]; [Way 2009: 1]). That is, we use this 
word (sometimes) in order to criticize another person for a response. This form of criticism con-
trasts with merely evaluating a response as bad and with merely criticizing the person’s rational 
subsystem for malfunctioning. Proponents of the current debate take the criticizability of irration-
ality to support the thought that rational requirements have a certain authority that other norms—
say, those of etiquette—lack. 
Insofar as theorists of rationality are interested in a property closely connected to criticism 
and praise, they restrict their argument to the uses of ‘(ir)rational’ that interest them, and exclude 
uses of ‘irrational’ that, for example, refer to pathology. In this vein, Kiesewetter writes that 
 
[t]he notion of irrationality we are interested in when asking for the normativity of rationality—the 
one that is associated with legitimate criticism—does, I think, require the capacity to modify one’s 
attitudes in the light of reflection, and thus the absence of compulsion [Kiesewetter 2017: 100]. 
 
Being irrationalRESP presupposes that the person is directly responsible for the attitudes that are 
evaluated as irrational. To see this, compare it with uses of ‘irrational’ that do not imply direct 
criticizability. Arachnophobia is irrational—a person suffering from it often fears a spider knowing 
that it is not dangerous. And yet we do not criticize arachnophobes directly for their fears. Rather, 
we hold them at most indirectly responsible (for doing therapy, for example). Such uses of ‘irra-
tional’ do not raise any question for the authority of a requirement to be rational. There just is no 
requirement not to fear spiders in place if the fear is not something for which the person is directly 
responsible. 
Thus, current theories of rationality want to focus on rationalityRESP. Furthermore, this re-
striction seems to be justified insofar it is pointless to require someone to be rational in cases of 
irrationality for which one is not directly responsible. The normative authority of rational require-
ments can be in place only if we are responsible for whether we comply with these requirements. 
 
3. Reasons-responsiveness 
According to the normative sense of ‘rational’, what rationality requires is just what you ought to. 
Broome thinks that ‘the normative sense is an invention of philosophers’ [sect. 4]. The ordinary 
use of ‘rational’, he says, is not identical to the normative sense. 
If rational requirements only exert normative authority when we talk about rationalityRESP, 
then this allows for the following strategy of replying to Broome: Even though our ordinary use 
of ‘rational’ is not identical with the normative sense, rationalityRESP can only consist in responding 
correctly to reasons. That is, while other uses of ‘(ir)rational’ that do not imply blame- or praise-
worthiness could be understood as referring to forms of (in)coherence, rationalityRESP is more 
plausibly understood as a form of reasons-responsiveness. In this section, I sketch an argument for 
this idea. 
As mentioned in section 2 above, a straightforward way for defending the authority of 
rational requirements it to argue that their authority is implied by the fact that violating rational 
requirements makes us criticizable. Let me begin by pointing out a prima facie problem for any 
such argument from criticizability. I then modify this argument so that it builds on the idea that 
the criticism in question presupposes responsibility—i.e., amounts to a form of blame. 
The prima facie problem for any argument from criticizability is that not all forms of crit-
icizing a person imply that they violated a normative requirement. Take the forms of criticism 
Parfit mentions (‘foolish’, ‘stupid’, ‘crazy’). Such expressions might be applied to a person be-
cause of some cognitive malfunctioning for which they are not responsible. If they are not respon-
sible for it, then we could not say that the criticized person ‘ought not’ to be foolish (etc.). The 
criticizability-intuition thus can only support the authority of rational requirements if we take the 
criticism in question to presuppose direct responsibility for the irrational attitudes—i.e., if we take 
the criticism to be a form of blame. 
I thus suggest the following modification: the argument from responsibility. It starts off by 
pointing out that merely being incoherent is not a good ground for blame. For incoherence might 
be pathological: if you believe that p and believe that not-p then you need not be blameworthy for 
holding your incoherent set of beliefs. In such cases, your incoherence might not be sufficiently 
responsive to reasons for you to be responsible for it. By contrast, reasons-responsiveness is a 
plausible ground for responsibility: in order for you to be directly responsible for your attitudes, 
they must be sufficiently responsive to reasons. Failing to properly exercise your capacity of rea-
sons-responsiveness can make you blameworthy. Thus, since reasons-responsiveness is a much 
better ground for responsibility than merely having (in)coherent attitudes, rationalityRESP is more 
plausibly a form of reasons-responsiveness. 
One could object that this confuses reasons-responsiveness—a capacity that grounds re-
sponsibility—with responding correctly to reasons—which is a specific way of exercising reasons-
responsiveness. It might be true that any attitude that is evaluated as (ir)rationalRESP needs to be 
sufficiently responsive to reasons. But that does not imply that whenever we are (ir)rationalRESP, 
we (fail) to respond correctly to our reasons. 
This objection assumes the falsity of the following principle: 
 NC. If you are responsible for whether you comply with norm N in virtue of a capacity C, then 
your praise- or blameworthiness for complying or, respectively, violating N is grounded in a suc-
cessful exercise or, respectively, failure of C. 
 
If NC was true, and if our responsibility for whether we are (ir)rational is grounded in reasons-
responsiveness, then our praise- or blameworthiness for being (ir)rational is grounded in a suc-
cessful exercise or, respectively, failure of reasons-responsiveness. That is, whenever we are re-
sponsible for our (ir)rationality, we respond correctly or, respectively, fail to respond correctly to 
our reasons. NC has initial plausibility when we think about moral requirements: It seems that if 
our responsibility for complying with moral requirements is grounded in our ability to voluntarily 
control our conduct, then we are praise- or blameworthy in virtue of our successful exercise or 
failure of voluntary control. (Note, importantly, that this is a conditional claim.) 
This is not the place to defend NC. My aim was to present an argument why rationalityRESP 
is plausibly understood as reasons-responsiveness. Discussing the arguments from criticizability 
or from responsibility would require discussing the concept of responsibility and its conceptual 
connections to norms and reasons. I think that these arguments are interesting enough to merit such 
discussions. 
If the argument from responsibility is sound, then Broome could react in two ways. He 
could either argue that his own theory does not focus on rationalityRESP. However, then his dispute 
with Lord and Kiesewetter might be only apparent. Or Broome could say that his theory is also 
only concerned with instances of (in)coherence for which we are responsible. However, together 
with the argument from responsibility, this would imply that whenever we are (in)coherent, we 
(fail to) respond correctly to our reasons. Broome’s opposition to theories of rationality as reasons-
responsiveness would then not be an opposition against the idea that rational requirements are 
requirements to respond to one’s reasons. Rather, he then merely denies that we ought to respond 
to our reasons—i.e., to those reasons that we have or that are accessible to us. I now turn to this 
dispute. 
 
 
 
4. Internalisms and Externalisms 
Lord and Kiesewetter argue that what rationality requires is what you ought to do. A problem is 
that, intuitively, rationality supervenes on the mind, while normativity does not: what you ought 
to do can be affected by facts outside your ken; but what is rational for you cannot be affected by 
such facts. Kiesewetter replies to this problem by arguing that normativity supervenes on the mind 
(like rationality); Lord replies to it by arguing that rationality does not always supervene on the 
mind (like normativity). Broome rejects both strategies. I illustrate in this section how questions 
about responsibility become relevant to these disputes if we talk about rationalityRESP. 
 
4.1 Internalism about normativity 
Consider Broome’s argument against Kiesewetter’s claim that normativity supervenes on the 
mind. Broome argues that normativity sometimes requires us to act on the outside world, and thus 
cannot supervene on the mind. But rationality does supervene on the mind. Thus, normativity and 
rationality are not identical (see [sect. 6]). 
One way to respond to this is to reject that theories of rationality are concerned with ac-
tions: most they can do is to show that the attitudes that rationality requires are the ones we ought 
to have; they do not claim that the actions that rationality requires (if it requires any at all) are the 
ones we ought to perform. However, it is not clear to me whether all philosophers engaging in the 
debate would accept this restriction. Internalists might instead want to find a way of rejecting 
Broome’s assumption that normativity does not supervene on the mind if it sometimes requires us 
to act on the outside world.1 
Even if internalists are successful in making this intelligible, Broome’s objection will pro-
vide another challenge for them, stemming from the concept of responsibility. For the debate’s 
focus on rationalityRESP  suggests the following version of Broome’s argument: 
 
(1) We are not responsible for things that we could not foresee. 
(2) If (1), then rationalityRESP  cannot require us to act on the outside world. 
(3) However, we sometimes ought to act on the outside world. 
(4) Thus, what we ought to is not always what rationalityRESP  requires us to. 
 
 
1 See Kiesewetter (this edition) for both strategies mentioned. 
One could object to (2) that our actions are not always unforeseeable—namely, in cases where we 
have a certain amount control over (and thus knowledge of) whether our actions successful. In 
reply, Broome could modify the notion of ‘acting on the outside world’ in such a way that it means 
‘acting when our success is not under our control’. However, then (3) is implausible if one accepts 
‘ought implies can’: if our success is not under our control, then it is also false that we ought to act 
on the outside world. 
I suspect that Broome would object that it is possible that we take all reasonable means in 
order to ensure that we do what we ought to do and yet fail to do what we ought to do due to 
circumstances outside our control (cf. his case where we ‘ought to insure our house against fire’ 
[sect. 6]). If we accept this, the only way to respond to his argument is to reject (1)—i.e., to allow 
that we can be responsible for things that we could not foresee. 
 
4.2 Externalism about rationality 
Questions concerning responsibility also matter for Broome’s dispute with Lord. Lord thinks that 
his view about rationality allows him to account for our intuitions about the equal rationality of 
persons in good and bad cases (bad ones are cases in which a subject is radically deceived about 
their environment, but which are, from the subject’s perspective, indistinguishable from good 
cases, in which the subject’s duplicate is not deceived). However, Lord [2018: 198] concedes that, 
according to his account, there will always be cases conceivable in which the subject in the bad 
case is less rational merely because they were systematically deceived. 
Whether Lord’s view is maintainable will depend on what conception of responsibility is 
plausible. If we are responsible for being less rational in a bad case than we would be in a good 
case, then the subject in the bad case could be more blameworthy than their good-case duplicate. 
Our blameworthiness could change due to mere luck. In ethics, there is discussion about the pos-
sibility of ‘moral luck’. Defending an externalist account of rationalityRESP is to argue that there is 
a corresponding thing when it comes to rationality—call it ‘rational luck’. If holding someone 
responsible for their (ir)rationality is a matter of adjusting our attitudes towards the person in cer-
tain ways (by forms of praise and blame), then the dispute is about the following question: Can it 
be appropriate to have different attitudes (of the relevant kind) towards A than towards B even 
though A’s and B’s situations are identical from their perspective? 
 
5. Concluding Remark 
Questions concerning responsibility are central to the rationality debate. The focus of the debate 
on rationalityRESP supports the idea that to be rational is to respond correctly to one’s reasons, and 
might thus be identical to normativity. Furthermore, this focus implies that debates between inter-
nalists and externalists (about normativity and rationality) hinge on questions concerning respon-
sibility. Theorists of rationality should thus engage in debates about responsibility. 
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